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MODERN CORPORATE THEORY: PUBLIC UTILITY OR
PRIVATE PART? A COMMENT ON PROFESSOR
WOLFE'S PAPER
CHARLES YABLON*
Well, we asked for it. We invited Alan Wolfe, a distinguished social
theorist who has written extensively and powerfully about the epistemological
and ethical deficiencies of current social thought, ' and asked him to take a
look at what passes for theory in the field of corporate law. Now Professor
Wolfe is a generous man, and obviously does not mean to offend, but he
is a connoisseur of theory. He enjoys a good hearty helping of Weber, a
little sweet and sour Durkheim, maybe a light, airy bit of Derrida for
dessert. He has sampled current corporate law theory and he is saying, as
nicely as possible, that as best he can tell, it is mush. Cold mush. Cold
thin mush. Mush-because it provides neither an adequate factual descrip-
tion of how corporate actors behave nor an attractive prescriptive theory
of how they should behave. 2 Cold and thin-because it embodies a concept
of the individual devoid of culture, emotions and relationships, whose sole
motivation is wealth maximization.3
So far, Professor Wolfe probably would not get much of an argument,
at least from many of the participants in this symposium. The criticisms he
makes of the new economic theory of the firm, as he recognizes, echo and
expand on comments previously made by its critics within the corporate
law academy. 4 When he .turns to consider alternatives to the dominant
* Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. I would like to thank my
colleague Bill Bratton for reading and commenting on a prior version of this piece in an effort
to keep me out of trouble. I would also like to thank all the participants in the Washington
and Lee symposium for laughing at the right places. As for the mistakes in this piece, I accept
all the responsibility and none of the blame.
1. See, e.g., ALAN WOLFE, WHOSE KEEPER? SOCIAL SCIENCE AND MORAL OBLIGATION
(1989).
2. Alan Wolfe, The Modern Corporation: Private Agent or Public Actor, 50 WAsH. &
LEE L. REv. 1673, 1683 (1993) (hereinafter Modern Corporation).
3. Id. at 1687-88.
4. See, e.g., William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical
Perspectives From History, 41 STAN. L. Rv. 1471 (1989); William W. Bratton, Jr., The
"Nexus of Contracts" Corporation: A Critical Appraisal, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 407 (1989);
Victor Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85
COLUM. L. REv. 1403 (1985) ; Lynne L. Dallas, Two Models of Corporate Governance:
Beyond Berle and Means, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REPF. 19 (1988); Lyman Johnson, Sovereignty
Over Corporate Stock, 16 DEL. J. CORP. L.. 485 (1991); David Millon, Frontiers of Legal
Thought I: Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DuKE L.J. 201; Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Critical
Look at Corporate Governance, 45 VANi. L. REv. 1263 (1992); Marleen A. O'Connor,
Restructuring the Corporation's Nexus of Contracts: Recognizing a Fiduciary Duty to Protect
Displaced Workers, 69 N.C. L. REv. 1189 (1991); Charles D. Watts, Jr., Corporate Legal
Theory Under the First Amendment: Bellotti and Austin, 46 U. MuAi L. REv. 317 (1991);
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economic theory of the firm, however, he finds that there really are none.
His paper points out how numerous advocates of a more "public" concep-
tion of the corporation nonetheless adopt, implicitly or explicitly, the
fundamental assumptions about corporate relationships embodied in the
dominant paradigm.' There is, in current corporate law discourse, no real
alternative, either at a conceptual or programmatic level, to that theory.
Indeed, when viewed from the level of fundamental institutions, the
distance separating those corporate law academics who argue for a somewhat
greater degree of governmental regulation of managerial conduct, and those
who seek a reduced governmental role, is not very great. Everyone writing
about corporate law, with the possible exception of a few Marxists and
Michael Jensen, 6 assumes that the public corporation, with its familiar
separation of ownership and control, will remain the dominant mode for
conducting economic activity in the United States, and that the fundamental
relationship between managers, shareholders and employees will remain
essentially unchanged. Corporate law academics are like a bunch of interior
designers trying to hang a picture on the living room wall. A few of us
say, "move it a little to the left," and a few more say, "no, a little to the
right." But nobody wants to put a different picture up there.
Professor Wolfe notes all of this, and is not particularly disturbed by
any of it. He recognizes the defects of the nexus of contracts theory of the
firm, tells us that he prefers the "inconsistency" of its critics to the
"unreality" of the model,7 but does not expect corporate law theorists to
develop an alternative model any time soon. Rather, he pats us on the head
and tells us to keep "muddling through," that caution is the appropriate
response in complex matters such as this, and that no theory will ever fully
capture the oxymoronic nature of the public-private corporation.'
I agree with Professor Wolfe in almost all his specific comments about
the state of contemporary corporate law theory. Unfortunately, teaching
and writing about corporate law is what I do for a living. Now, I can live
with the fact that the dominant paradigm in my field is mushy and fails to
capture important aspects of corporate reality, that the critiques of the
dominant paradigm are inconsistent and marginal, and that all I can hope
to do is "muddle through." My real problem is with a conclusion that is
implicit but unstated in Professor Wolfe's paper.
Lyman Johnson, Individual and Collective Sovereignty in the Corporate Enterprise, 92 COLUM.
L. REV. 2215 (1992) (reviewing FRANK A. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FisCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991) and ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., THE GOOD SOCIETY
(1991)); Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Cult of Efficiency, 71 TEx. L. REV. 217 (1992) (reviewing
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE EcoNOMIc STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE
LAW (1991)).
5. Wolfe, supra note 2, at 1688-92.
6. Michael C. Jensen, The Eclipse of the Public Corporation, 67 HARv. Bus. REV.,
Sept.-Oct. 1989, at 61.
7. Wolfe, supra note 2, at 1676.
8. Id. at 1692-95.
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If corporate law theory is, as Professor Wolfe portrays it, viewed as
nothing more than an exercise in endlessly rehashing and reemphasizing the
public and/or private aspects of corporate relationships, then it is, and will
remain, incredibly boring. I am willing to concede that corporate law can
never be made theoretically coherent, or develop a normatively satisfying
account of the distribution of powers among capital, management and
labor. I am unwilling to concede, however, that it has to stay as boring as
it currently is. 9
So I decided to reread Professor Wolfe's paper from a different per-
spective-not as a critique of contemporary corporate law theory (which it
is), but as a metacritique of contemporary discourse about corporate law
theory (which it also is). From this latter perspective, the crucial question
Professor Wolfe raises is whether boredom is an inevitable consequence of
theoretical discourse in corporate law, or merely an epiphenomenon caused
by an unfortunate concatenation of current methodology and personnel.
My conclusion is that there is hope. Implicit in Professor Wolfe's paper
are a number of programmatic suggestions for reducing the turgidity factor
in corporate law discourse. The remainder of this Comment will be devoted
to elucidating those suggestions as explicitly as possible.
Professor Wolfe begins his paper with the familiar antinomies of
corporate existence. Is the corporation an entity or an aggregate, artificial
or natural, public or private? The debates on these definitional issues have
always struck me as vaguely unreal, something like arguing about whether
Greenland is a large island or a small continent, or whether a minivan is a
large car or a small truck. Since no empirical evidence seems persuasive or
even relevant to such debates, the interesting question is why such insub-
stantial issues continue to engage the attention of very substantial scholars.
Professor Wolfe considers the possibility, put forth by David Millon, that
our theory of corporate ontology influences our beliefs about the appropriate
degree of governmental regulation of corporate actors.'0 Professor Wolfe
expresses some skepticism about this idea, pointing out that corporate law
theorists rarely apply their theoretical positions in a consistent manner when
engaged in policy debates.
9. The claim that corporate law is boring should not be confused with the more
ambitious claim, put forward most forcefully by Bernard Black, that corporate law is trivial.
See Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic Analysis, 84 Nw.
U. L. REv. 542 (1990). A moment's reflection will reveal many things that are extremely
significant, but boring (e.g., the federal budget) and others that are trivial but rather interesting
(e.g., Joey Buttafuoco). It must be conceded, however, that many things that are trivial are
also pretty boring (e.g., golf).
10. Wolfe, supra note 2, at 1673 (citing Millon, supra note 4, at 241). In his article,
Professor Millon actually argues both that theories of the corporation influence beliefs about
corporate policy and that policy positions. influence theories of corporate ontology. In this he
is undoubtedly correct. Where Professors Wolfe, Millon and I would probably disagree,
however, is in our views of the relative strength of the influence of policy on theory and of
theory on policy.
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This same unease over the way corporate lawyers use theory is expressed
by Professor Wolfe in his discussion of the new economic theory of the
firm. Professor Wolfe is familiar with two broad categories of theories,
descriptive theories that explain how institutions actually function and
prescriptive theories that explain how they should function. The nexus of
contracts theory appears to fall into neither category. Its account of the
behavior of corporate actors is too simplistic to be descriptive, and its
normative implications are too unattractive to be prescriptive.
I would suggest to Professor Wolfe that the theory is neither prescriptive
nor descriptive, but a third category. We might call it a "theory of
justification." Some of the nexus of contract types, in their more candid
moments, refer to it as a "heuristic."" What it really is, however, is just
an old-fashioned legal argument. Like most legal arguments, those made
by proponents of the new economic theory of the firm seek to justify
existing or proposed legal rules against a shifting background of descriptive
and prescriptive accounts of the world in which those legal rules operate.' 2
Thus, a skillful account of the contracts supposedly implicit in the corporate
relationship can be used to justify prohibitions on takeover defenses,'3
massive stock payments to corporate officers,' 4 legalization of insider trading 5
and the reduction of liability of corporate directors for breach of fiduciary
duties.1
6
11. See Robert E. Scott, Through Bankruptcy with the Creditors' Bargain Heuristic, 53
U. Cm. L. REv. 690 (1986) (reviewing DouGL.As G. BARD & THOMAS H. JACKSON, CASES,
PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS ON BANKRUPTCY (1985)). See also Ronald J. Gilson & Robert N.
Mnookin, Coming of Age in a Corporate Law Firm: The Economics of Associate Career
Patterns, 41 STAN. L. REv. 567, 570 (1989) (seeking to apply nexus of contracts approach to
actual institutional analysis to show that it is more than just "powerful heuristic").
12. The malleability of legal argument is a central feature in the ongoing legal debate
about the "indeterminacy of the law." Some of my favorite articles on this topic are James
Boyle, The Politics of Reason: Critical Legal Theory and Local Social Thought, 133 U. PA.
L. REv. 685, 695 (1985); Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REv. 57
(1984); Allan Hutchinson, Democracy and Determinism: An Essay on Legal Interpretation, 43
U. MIA.I L. REv. 541 (1989); Duncan Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A
Critical Phenomenology, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 518 (1986); Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of
American Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1151, 1155-56 (1985); Joseph W. Singer, The Player and the
Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1 (1984); John Stick, Can Nihilism Be
Pragmatic? 100 HARv. L. REv. 332 (1986); Charles M. Yablon, The Indeterminacy of the
Law: Critical Legal Studies and the Problem of Legal Explanation, 6 CARDozo L. REv. 917
(1985); J. M. Balkin, Ideology as Constraint, 43 STAN. L. REv. 1133 (1991) (reviewing ANDREW
ALTMAN, CITICAL LEGAL STUrDES: A LmERAL CRITIQUE (1990)).
13. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Manage-
ment in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARv. L. REv. 1161 (1981).
14. Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentives-It's Not How Much You
Pay, But How, HARV. Bus. REv., May-June 1990, at 138 (arguing that senior executives will
only have optimal performance incentives when they have meaningful share of total corporate
equity).
15. HENRY MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966); Jonathan R.
Macey, From Fairness to Contract: The New Direction of the Rules Against Insider Trading,
13 HOFSTRA L. REv. 9 (1984).
16. Continuation of Discussion of Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and
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Are these strange policy positions the results of the application of a
defective theory? I do not think so. Rather, I think the strange theory is a
result of attempts to justify these defective policy positions. In fairness, I
should add that like many legal arguments, the new theory of the firm can,
and has, also been used to justify positions directly contrary to those just
stated. 7 The point is that one's theory of corporate ontology does not have
much causal impact on one's position with regard to particular regulatory
issues. More often, a person's position on a particular regulatory issue
results in the adoption, at least temporarily, of a certain account of corporate
ontology.
Such considerations may seem illicit in the value-free world of social
science. As a lawyer, however, I am perfectly comfortable with a system in
which (a) someone pays me some money up front, (b) that person tells me
what position to support and (c) I argue for that position as persuasively
as I can.
Now don't get me wrong. I am not suggesting that academic lawyers
operate from the same base pecuniary motives as our colleagues in practice.
Quite the contrary, we operate from a very different set of base pecuniary
motives. Suffice it to say that we all have an "investment" of some sort
in the positions we espouse, and that we all do our best to formulate the
strongest possible arguments in support of those positions. Does that mean
that we really do not believe our own arguments? Nonsense. Every lawyer
worth her fee knows that the first step in effective advocacy is to train
oneself to believe one's own arguments. 8 My point is simply that the debate
about corporate law theory is best (and most interestingly) understood, not
as an attempt to uncover the true nature of the corporation, but as a set
of competing policy arguments about the appropriate type and degree of
corporate regulation.
From this perspective, we can see why Professor Wolfe is right to prefer
the inconsistency of the critics of the economic theory of the firm to the
unreality of the theory as put forth by its proponents. In the world of legal
argument, inconsistency is a pardonable sin. Judges and lawyers know that
most general principles of law, consistently applied, lead to absurd or at
least rather uncomfortable results.
Unreality, however, or misrepresenting the facts of the case, is a much
more egregious fault. A lawyer in a contract action involving the statute of
frauds who gets up and says, "Your Honor, let's just assume there was a
valid contract in this case" really has not grasped the point of the enterprise.
Recommendations, Tent. Draft No. 5, 63 A.L.I. PROC. 395, 411-13 (1986) (comments of Judge
Frank H. Easterbrook).
17. See, e.g., Wolfe, supra note 2.
18. See JAm s C. FREUND, LAWYERING: A REALiSTIC APPROACH TO LEGAL PRACTICE 214-
15 (1979) ("[The] hallmark of the effective advocate is his belief in the rightness of his
cause .... And before he can set out to persuade others to agree, the first person to convince
is himself. However skeptically the litigator begins, by the time he's arguing the case in court,
his belief is total and absolutely sincere.").
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Similarly, just positing the existence, at some level of generality, of an
implicit understanding by corporate actors of their respective roles does not
tell us what legal standards should apply in specific areas of corporate law.
The theory cannot and does not tell us what actual power relationships and
expectations exist among corporate actors in real institutions. It does not
tell us the levels of generality and certainty at which the corporate law rules
do or should operate, and it does not consider whether there are equitable
principles apart from the hypothetical expectations of the parties that would
justify a particular result.
In short, I believe Professor Wolfe's first suggestion for making cor-
porate law more interesting is that we think about these issues like lawyers,
not theorists. As lawyers, we do not need a competing theory to "beat"
the prevailing thin and mushy theory of the firm. We can adopt the
assumptions of the theory to the extent they seem to make sense and
comport with our best current understanding of corporate law realities. We
can abandon the theory when its assumptions appear unrealistic or its
prescriptions are unattractive or indeterminate. Most importantly, we can
ask a whole series of lawyerly questions about corporate law that the theory
does not and cannot answer. How are corporate law rules communicated
to corporate actors? At what degree of generality and certainty are they
understood? Who, in the corporate context, interprets the rules? How
effectively and consistently are violations of the rules constrained? Who
determines what actions violate those rules?
To help answer these questions, and to respond to Professor Wolfe's
critique of the thinness of corporate law theory, we should also follow a
second suggestion implicit in Professor Wolfe's paper. That is, we should
assume, contrary to prevailing theory, that most corporate directors, officers
and employees are human beings. They are motivated by love, hate, fear,
envy, friendship, loyalty and revenge as well as greed. They are smart,
dumb, clever, not quite as smart as they think they are, too clever by half,
honest, dishonest, and, all too often, confused.
How do we provide corporate law theory with a fuller, more human
account of corporate actors? One way is by paying attention to the works
of various social scientists, like Robert Frank, who are trying to develop
economic or social theories that rely on a fuller and more realistic account
of human behavior. 9 Another is to pay some attention to that much scorned
discipline, management studies. Many corporate law theorists pride them-
selves on their familiarity with and understanding of the latest financial
work being done at the top business schools. Management studies from
those same schools get far less attention. This is, of course, a reflection of
the academy's preference for hard theory over soft case studies. 20 But
19. ROBERT H. FRANK, CHOOSING THE RIGHT POND: HUMAN BEHAVIOR AND THE QUEST
FOR STATUS (1985); ROBERT H. FRANK, PASSIONS WITHIN REASON: THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF
THE EMOTIONS (1988).
20. See An Economist Takes Tea with a Management Guru, ECONOMIST, Jan. 3, 1992,
at 89.
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doesn't hard theory also imply that the enormous popularity of books by
management gurus like Peter Drucker indicates that such people might
provide useful insights into the actual behavior of corporate managers?
21
The third and final suggestion implicit in Professor Wolfe's paper is
that corporate law academics should broaden their horizons. In its most
banal period, corporate law scholarship involved explaining why the standard
corporate law rule in a given area, whatever it happened to be, provided
the best incentives for the efficient conduct of corporate activity. 22 In recent
years, however, corporate lawyers have begun to notice that the rules in
places like Japan and Germany are very different from ours, yet many of
those companies seem to be functioning as efficiently as or even more
efficiently than their American counterparts. 23 To some, this suggests that
their legal rules, with regard to things like shareholdings by financial
institutions, are better than ours. To others, it suggests that corporate law
rules may not be very important variables in competitive success. At the
very least, however, a recognition that there are many successful ways to
regulate corporate activity should help protect corporate law scholarship
from the worst forms of parochialism.
By the same token, a little bit of historical perspective could sometimes
be useful. It might tell us, for example, whether the development of the
market for corporate control in the 1980s really did enhance managerial
efficiency relative to, say, the 1950s, when hostile takeovers were almost
nonexistent.74
21. See, e.g., $6000 Lecture Series: The Masters of Managing Tell All, L.A. TimEs, Jan.
8, 1986, Pt. 5, at 1; Christopher Lorenz, Drucker and the Art of Studied Simplicity, FIN.
TMEs, Sept. 23, 1983, at 12 (discussing how Peter Drucker and other management gurus make
big bucks).
22. See Johnson, Individual and Collective Sovereignty in the Corporate Enterprise, supra
note 4, at 2235-45 (criticizing assumption that corporate law rules are efficient).
23. Richard M. Buxbaum, Institutional Owners and Corporate Managers: A Comparative
Perspective, 57 BROOK. L. REv. 1 (1991); J. Mark Ramseyer, Columbian Cartel Launches Bid
for Japanese Firms, 102 YALE L.J. 2005 (1993); Mark J. Roe, Some Differences in Corporate
Structure in Germany, Japan and the United States, 102 YALE L.J. 1927 (1993); Roberta
Romano, A Cautionary Note on Drawing Lessons from Comparative Corporate Law, 102
YALE L.J. 2021 (1993).
24. The work of Alfred D. Chandler, for example, would appear to raise serious
challenges to those who champion the efficiency-enhancing power of the market for corporate
control. In his most recent book, ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., SCALE AND SCOPE: THE DYN lMIcs
OF INDuSTRIAL CAPrrAuLsa 627 (1990), he expresses concern that extensive merger activity
inhibits the long-term development of capital intensive industries. In ALFRED D. CHANDLER,
JR., THE VnsxIaE HAND-THE MANAGERIAL REvOLUION iN AmEIuCAN BusiNEss (1977), Chandler
describes the relatively mergerless 1950s as a time of major efficiency-enhancing innovations
in American corporate management.
Similarly, with regard to the ongoing debate regarding executive compensation, there is
historical evidence that executive compensation levels were extremely high in the late 1920s
and early 1930s, fell dramatically to a low point in the 1950s, and are now beginning again
to reach the highest levels of the early 1930s. See Charles M. Yablon, Overcompensating: The
Corporate Lawyer and Executive Pay, 92 Coaum. L. REv. 1867, 1871 n.9 (1992) (reviewing
GRAF CRYSTAL, IN SEARcH OF ExcEss (1991)). Again, it is hard to see how the higher
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Finally, it might also be interesting to broaden our understanding of
the subject matter of corporate law. The fact is that some of the most
important and most debated issues in this country are direct outgrowths of
corporate decisionmaking. I have in mind such questions as unemployment
and underemployment, the lack of job creation in the recent recovery, the
fear of a loss of competitiveness by many sectors of American industry
relative to foreign companies, the desirability and possibility of freer inter-
national trade, and great concern about the growing disparities of wealth
and economic opportunity among the people of this country. None of these
issues falls within the traditional boundaries of corporate law, at least as it
is currently taught and discussed in law schools. Perhaps this is simply a
result of the artificial way legal topics are distributed through the law school
curriculum. The primary subject of corporate law, at least as it is taught
in American law schools, is management-shareholder relations, while man-
agement-labor relations is a matter for labor law, competitiveness is an
issue for the antitrust course, and who knows where they talk about wealth
disparities.
I suspect, however, that corporate law academics rather approve of the
limitations they have placed on their field of inquiry. If corporate law
scholarship were not confined to marginal issues, corporate law academics
might have to avoid irresponsible or poorly thought out opinions, an
unconscionable restraint on free expression. It might be interesting to find
out, however, if corporate law scholars, with our presumed expertise in the
rules, incentives and constraints on corporate managerial activity, can shed
any light on the growing concern that American corporations are failing in
their basic public role as the engines of economic growth and opportunity.
If our current theories and scholarship can provide no such insights, that
may itself be a pretty damning indictment of our field.
In any event, I thank Professor Wolfe for his paper, and am sure that
our hosts will serve him something better than corporate law theory for
dinner tonight.
compensation levels of the early 1930s or late 1980s (much of it based on "incentive"
compensation plans) resulted in better executive management.
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